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The December Massacre: Obstruction of Justice or Lumps of Coal 
for Naughty Attorneys? 
 
On October 20, 1973, President Richard Nixon ordered 
Attorney General Elliot Richardson, the head of the Department 
of Justice, to fire special prosecutor Archibald Cox.1  Cox, who 
was investigating the Watergate scandal, had issued a subpoena 
to the President requesting copies of taped Oval Office 
conversations.2  Attorney General Richardson refused and resigned 
in protest.3  President Nixon then made the same demand to Deputy 
Attorney General William Ruckelshaus, who likewise refused and 
resigned immediately.4  President Nixon hunted for the next-in-
command and found Solicitor General Robert Bork, who finally 
carried out the orders.5   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See The Watergate Story, The Government Acts, The 
Washingtonpost.com Special Reports,  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/special/watergate/part2.html. 
2 Id.  
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
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 President Nixon’s unconscionable actions and the sequence 
of events that night became infamously known as the Saturday 
Night Massacre.6  His actions, seen as a gross abuse of 
presidential power, infuriated the general public and Congress 
so intensely that Congress would eventually file impeachment 
bills against the President.7  President Nixon defended his 
actions in a famous press conference on November 17, 1973: 
...in all of my years of public life, I have never 
obstructed justice.  And I think, too, that I can say 
that in my years of public life that I've welcomed 
this kind of examination, because people have got to 
know whether or not their President's a crook.  Well, 
I'm not a crook! I've earned everything I've got.8 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See David S. Broder, Nixon Political Clout Shrinks, Wash. Post, 
Oct. 22, 1973, at A1. 
7 See Seven Tumultuous Days, Time Mag., Nov. 5, 1973, Cover 
Story, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,908090,00.html.   
8 R. W. Apple, Jr., Nixon Declares He Didn’t Profit From Public 
Life, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1973, at GN1.  See also, Videotape: 
Richard Nixon, Speech, Nov. 17, 1973, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/video/2007/06/14/VI2007061401227.html. 
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On August 8, 1974, in an effort to avoid removal by impeachment 
and possible criminal charges, President Nixon would become the 
first President in U.S. history to resign.9 
 In December 2006, another White House administration took 
steps to remove officials from the Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”), whose investigations with its political agenda.  On 
December 6, in an unprecedented move, the Administration 
notified seven United States Attorneys (“U.S. Attorneys”) and 
requested their resignation, effectually firing them.10  While 
the DOJ initially stated that the dismissals were due to poor 
performance issues,11 further inquiry revealed that dismissals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Resigns, Wash. Post, Aug. 9, 
1974, at A1. 
10 See David Johnston, Justice Dept. Names New Prosecutors, 
Forcing Some out, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 2007, at A17. 
11 See Dan Eggen, Deputy Attorney General Defends Prosecutor 
Firings, Wash. Post, Feb. 7, 2007, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/02/06/AR2007020600732.html; Dan Eggen 
and Paul Kane, Gonzales: ‘Mistakes Were Made’ But Attorney 
General Defends Firing of Eight U.S. Attorneys, Wash. Post, Mar. 
14, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/03/13/AR2007031300776.html. 
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were politically motivated.12  The White House and Attorney 
General (“AG”) Gonzales brushed aside any questions of 
impropriety and only emphasized that all U.S. Attorneys “serve 
at the pleasure of the President.”13  While U.S. Attorneys do 
serve under the authority of President,14 this presidential 
privilege does not – as demonstrated by Watergate – exempt the 
White House from charges of obstruction of justice or other 
charges.15 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See Eggen, supra note 11.  
13 See Dan Eggen and Paul Kane, Gonzales: ‘Mistakes Were Made’ 
But Attorney General Defends Firing of Eight U.S. Attorneys, 
Wash. Post, Mar. 14, 2007, at A1, available at  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/03/13/AR2007031300776.html. 
14 United States Attorneys Mission Statement, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/offices/mission.html. [hereinafter 
“Mission Statement.” 
15 See Laurie Nadel, The Great Stream of History: A Biography of 
Richard M. Nixon, 168-179 (1991).  On March 1, 1974, a grand 
jury indicted White House aides H. R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, 
Charles Colson, John Mitchell, and others for the Watergate 
cover-up.  President Nixon was named as an unindicted co-
conspirator.  On July 27, 1974, the House Judiciary Committee 
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 This note will investigate whether the firing of two U.S. 
Attorneys - Carol Lam and David Iglesias16 – violated federal 
obstruction of justice statute 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c).  Part I will 
provide an overview of the U.S. Attorney position and background 
information of Lam and Iglesias’s dismissals.  Part II will 
explore the legal questions raised by the Bush Administration’s 
action, and Part III will discuss the federal obstruction of 
justice statute in detail.  Part IV will analyze the dismissals 
of Lam and Iglesias under the federal statute, respectively.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
passed the first three articles of impeachment, finding Nixon 
guilty of obstruction of justice in covering up the burglary.  
The House voted to impeach Nixon, and when it became apparent 
that the Senate would act similarly, Nixon resigned on August 8, 
1974 to avoid impeachment.  A month later, President Gerald Ford 
would pardon Nixon for his role in Watergate.  Id.    
16 I focused on the dismissals of Lam and Iglesias because the 
circumstances of their dismissals, compared to the other 
attorneys, appeared to be the clearest violations of the federal 
obstruction of justice statute.  In addition, because the media 
extensively covered and criticized Lam’s dismissal and Iglesias 
publically defended his tenure as U.S. Attorney, more facts are 
available regarding these two dismissals.  See discussion infra 
Part IV. 
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Lastly, Part V will include recommendations for ensuring justice 
and protecting the integrity of the U.S. Attorney office.   
I. Background 
A. U.S. Attorneys’ Role and Functions 
U.S. Attorneys are attorneys that represent the United 
States in federal cases.17  They serve as the nation’s principal 
litigators in both civil and criminal cases in which the United 
States is a party.18  As a government lawyer, a U.S. Attorney has 
a “greater responsibility to pursue the common good or the 
public interest than their counterparts in private practice, who 
represent non-governmental persons and entities.”19  Imbued with 
a duty to “seek justice,” U.S. Attorneys must seek an outcome 
that is “just” and “fair,” not merely a victory for the 
government.20  Additionally, as prosecutors, U.S. Attorneys serve 
as “ministers of justice” and must “see that defendants[s] [are] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 28 U.S.C. § 547 (2007). 
18 Id.  See also Mission Statement, supra note 14.   
19 See Bruce A. Green, Must Government Lawyers “Seek Justice” in 
Civil Litigation?, 9 Widener J. Pub. L. 235 (2000).  See also 
Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, 
and Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. 
L. Rev. 789 (2000). 
20 Green, supra note 19, at 279-80.   
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accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the 
basis of sufficient evidence.”21  They must “refrain from 
prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported 
by probable cause.”22  Furthermore, U.S. Attorneys have broad 
discretion to in determining which cases to file,23 and they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8 (2002), Comment [1]. 
22 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a)(2002). 
23 U.S. v. Hall, 559 F. 2d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977).  In Hall, 
the appellee’s initial indictment was fatally defective and 
dismissed.  Id. at 1162.  A second indictment was filed with the 
necessary language, and the appellee moved to dismiss on several 
grounds, including abuse of prosecutorial discretion.  Id.  The 
U.S. Court of Appeals held that under 28 U.S.C. § 547, the U.S. 
Attorney had “broad discretion” in determining which cases to 
prosecute.  Id. at 1163.  See also People of State of N.Y. v. 
Muka, 440 F.Supp. 33, 36 (D. N.Y. 1977) (holding that U.S. 
Attorneys possess “an absolute and unreviewable discretion to 
what crimes to prosecute.”); U.S. v. Crisona, 440 F.Supp. 24, 26 
(D. N.Y 1977) (holding that “[i]t is within the sound discretion 
of the United States Attorney to determine which cases shall be 
brought against which defendants; in the absence of overreaching 
or deceit . . . it is an entirely proper use of that discretion 
to forego a potential prosecution where, in the opinion of the 
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cannot be forced to investigate or prosecute alleged criminal 
activity.24  They have the authority to set local priorities and 
set prosecution thresholds.25  These responsibilities led Justice 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
United States Attorney, an inculpated party’s aid in other 
matters outweighs the benefits of his prosecution.”).  See 
generally 28 U.S.C § 547 (2007).   
24 Fleetwood v. Thompson, 358 F.Supp. 310 (D. Ill. 1972).  In 
Fleetwood, the plaintiff alleged that two U.S. Attorneys joined 
with others to deprive him of his civil rights by failing to 
prosecute witnesses for alleged perjury.  Id. at 311.  In ruling 
against the plaintiff, the U.S. District Court held that courts 
may not interfere with the discretionary powers of U.S. 
Attorneys and that the U.S. Attorneys cannot be sued for “what 
they already have an absolute privilege to do.”  Id.  In 
addition, it stated that “none of the U.S. Attorneys can be 
compelled to investigate or prosecute alleged criminal 
activity.”  Id.  See also, U.S. v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (S.D. 
Miss. 1965) (stating that “courts are not to interfere with the 
free exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of 
the United States in their control over criminal prosecutions”). 
25 See House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Commercial and 
Administration Law, Hearing on the Dismissal of U.S. Attorneys, 
110th Cong. (2007) (statement of David Iglesias, former U.S. 
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Sutherland of the U.S. Supreme Court to state what is among the 
most quoted text describing the role of the U.S. Attorney:  
The United States Attorney is the representative not 
of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a 
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is 
as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and 
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution 
is not that it shall win a case, but that justice 
shall be done.  As such, he is in a peculiar and very 
definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim 
of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence 
suffer.  He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-
indeed, he should do so.  But while he may strike hard 
blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.  It 
is as much his duty to retrain from improper methods 
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is 
to use legitimate means to bring about a just one.26 
 
U.S. Attorneys are not elected officials but are appointed 
by the President of the United States and confirmed by the 
Senate.27  Some believe that this appointment process protects 
the attorneys from harmful “electoral consequences of their 
decisions” and shields them from improper public and political 
pressure.28  Each U.S. Attorney is assigned to a specific 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Attorney) available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/documents/housejudiciary_hearing_030607.htm  
[hereinafter “House Hearing”]. 
26 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
27 28 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2007). 
28 Todd Lochner, Strategic Behavior and Prosecutorial Agenda 
Setting in United States Attorneys’ Offices: The Role of U.S. 
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judicial district,29 of which they are often long-time residents 
or hold substantial personal knowledge of the area.30   93 U.S. 
Attorneys serve 94 U.S. districts, with Guam and the Northern 
Mariana Islands sharing one attorney.31  They serve for a term of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Attorneys and Their Assistants, 23 Just. Sys. J. 271, 276 
(2002).  See also Patrick J. Kelly, President’s Page, Bench and 
Bar of Minnesota, April 2007. 7. (“Beginning with the Founding 
Fathers’ decision to grant life tenure to federal judges, steps 
have been taken to insulate judicial decisions-making from 
political pressure.”).  However, since the President appoints 
the U.S. Attorney to office, the appointments themselves are not 
apolitical. 
29 See Mission Statement, supra note 14. 
30 See Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Firings of U.S. 
Attorneys, 110th Cong. (2007) (Opening statement of Carol Lam, 
former U.S. Attorney) available at 
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/documents/senatejudiciary_hearing_030607.htm 
[hereinafter “Senate Hearing”]. 
31 See Kevin Scott, CRS Report for Congress, U.S. Attorneys Who 
Have Served Less than Full Four-year Terms, 1981-2006, Feb. 22, 
2007, at 1, available at 
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four years, and upon the expiration of the term, they remain in 
office until a successor is appointed.32  The U.S. Attorneys 
serve in the Department of Justice, under the Executive Branch, 
under the supervision of the Attorney General.33  The attorneys 
are “subject to removal by the President” and may be terminated 
at any time.34  
Only the President can fire a U.S. Attorney.35  The AG lacks 
such power, and his ability to hire and fire staff depends on 
his influence with the President.36  When a newly-elected 
President comes into office, incumbent U.S. Attorneys normally 
submit their resignations.37  The President is then expected and 
permitted to fill these vacancies with whom he or she chooses, 
often political allies.38 
B.  December 2006 Dismissals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/83000.pdf 
[hereinafter “CSC Attorney Report”]. 
32 28 U.S.C. §541(b) (2007). 
33 See Mission Statement, supra note 14. 
34 28 U.S.C. §541(c) (2007). 
35 See James Eisenstein, Counsel for the United States 12 (1978). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 35. 
38 Id.  
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 On December 6, 2006, the White House, through the DOJ, 
dismissed seven U.S. Attorneys: David Iglesias, Carol Lam, 
Daniel Bogden, Paul Charlton, John McKay, Kevin Ryan, and 
Margaret Chiara.39  In January 2006, it had contacted the U.S. 
Attorney for Western Missouri, Todd Graves, and requested that 
he resign.40  In June 2006, it also asked Harry Earnest “Bud” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 See Dan Eggen, U.S. Attorney Firings Set Stage for 
Congressional Battle, Wash. Post, Feb. 4, 2006, at A07.  While 
these U.S. Attorneys were dismissed on this date, many remained 
in office to wrap up their duties.  See, e.g., infra note 40. 
40 See Amy Goldstein and Dan Eggen, Number of Fired Prosecutors 
Grows, Dismissals Began Earlier Than Justice Dept. Has Said, 
Wash. Post, May 10, 2007, at A1.  After the Bush Administration 
requested his resignation in January 2006, Graves announced his 
resignation on March 10, 2006 and left on March 24, 2006.  Id.  
Apparently, the White House noticed that Graves refused to take 
action against ACORN activists for allegedly registering 
ineligible people to vote.  ACORN workers encourage low-income 
people to vote, which typically results in increased Democratic 
votes.  In 2006, the Senate race between Republican Jim Talent 
and Democratic challenger Claire McCaskill was extremely close.  
In addition to the pressure to charge the ACORN activists, 
Bradley Scholzman, Graves’s supervisor, allegedly pressed Graves 
13	  
	  
Cummins, the U.S. Attorney for Eastern Arkansas, to resign to 
make room for Tim Griffin, a Karl Rove protégé.41   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
to bring a civil suit against Missouri Secretary of State Robin 
Carnahan, a Democrat, for failing to address voter fraud.  
Graves refused, and when he resigned, Scholzman filled the 
position himself.  As U.S. Attorney, Scholzman pressed voting-
fraud charges against four ACORD employees and did so less than 
a week before election day in 2006.  DOJ guidelines strongly 
discourage bringing such actions immediately before to an 
election.  Scholzman also pressed charges against Carnahan, 
which were dismissed for lack of merit.  Murrary Waas, The 
Scales of Justice, National J., May 31, 2007, available at   
http://news.nationaljournal.com/articles/070531nj1.htm. 
41 Dan Eggen and Amy Goldstein, E-Mails Show Machinations to 
Replace Prosecutor, Wash. Post, Mar. 23, 2007, at A1.  The 
Republicans were allegedly concerned that Cummins’s 
investigation of Missouri Republican Governor Matt Blunt would 
jeopardize the Missouri Senate race.  Governor Blunt and his 
administration that allegedly awarded state contracts to 
political contractors.  Cummins stated that a Justice Department 
official from the Bush Administration, William Mateja, 
repeatedly contacted him during the investigation, asking 
whether Blunt would be implicated in the corruption probe.  
14	  
	  
The December 2006 dismissals went largely unnoticed by 
Congress and the public and only gained media attention weeks 
later when it was hinted that the firings were to make room for 
Bush appointees.42  Some believe that “bloggers” were largely 
responsible for exposing this scandal, as traditional print 
media overlooked these dismissals.43  Media attention quickly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Murrary Waas, The Scales of Justice, National J., May 31, 2007, 
available at  
http://news.nationaljournal.com/articles/070531nj1.htm.  
42 See Mark Follman, Inside Bush’s Prosecutor Purge, Salon.com, 
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2007/02/28/attorneys/index_np.
html; Dan Eggen, U.S. Attorney Firings Set Stage for 
Congressional Battle, Wash. Post, Feb. 4, 2006, at A7.  
43 See Terry McDermott, Blogs Can Top the Presses, L.A. Times, 
Mar. 17, 2007, available at 
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-
blogs17mar17,0,2952916.story?coll=la-home-headlines; Jay Carney, 
Where Credit is Due, Swampland, Mar. 13, 2007, http://time-
blog.com/swampland/2007/03/where_credit_is_due.html; Walaika 
Haskins, Bloggers’ Greatest Hits, Volume 1, TechNewsWorld ,June 
27, 2007,http://www.technewsworld.com/story/58038.html. 
Josh Marshall of TalkingPointsMemo (TMP) identified the 
dismissals as an unprecedented running massacre back on January 
15	  
	  
snowballed.44  Iglesias’s public declaration in late February 
that he had been pressured by Republicans to expedite an 
investigation against a Democrat official further fueled 
theories that the dismissals were politically motivated.45   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16, 2007, prior to any news attention.  Josh Marshall, 
TalkingPointsMemo, Jan. 16, 2007, 
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/011960.php.  Interestingly 
enough, it was previously another emerging media medium, the 
television, that contributed to Nixon’s downfall.  The public 
could, for the first time, hear and see judicial proceedings, 
and the Watergate television coverage had nightly audiences.  
Nixon would eventually resign on television.  See generally, 
Laurie Nadel, The Great Stream of History: A Biography of 
Richard M. Nixon (1991). 
44 See Washington Post’s U.S. Attorney Firings Investigation, 
Washingtonpost.com, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/linkset/2007/03/05/LI2007030500666.html.   
45 See Jay Carney, Note from Underground, Swampland, Mar. 2, 
2007, http://time-
blog.com/swampland/2007/03/note_from_underground_1.html. 
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The DOJ initially explained it had dismissed all but one of 
the prosecutors for performance issues.46  But further inquiry 
revealed that most of the dismissed U.S. Attorneys had received 
positive job reviews.47  James B. Comey - the Justice 
Department’s second in command and “direct supervisor” of all 
U.S. Attorneys from 2003 to August 2005 - would later testify to 
a House Judiciary subcommittee that job performance was not a 
factor in the dismissals.48  He testified that he had positive 
experiences with the dismissed attorneys and that the reasons 
given for their firings were not consistent with his 
experience.49  All the fired attorneys had been appointed by the 
Bush Administration and had held their positions for substantial 
lengths of time.50  According to Comey, if performance was truly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 See Dan Eggen, Former Supervisor Extols Fired Prosecutors, 
Wash. Post, May 4, 2007, at A1. 
47 Id. 
48 Id.  
49 Id. 
50 See generally, Kyle Sampson’s emails, 
http://i.a.cnn.net/cnn/2007/images/03/13/doj.usatty.pdf 
[hereinafter “Sampson Emails”]. 
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the cause, the Justice Department had been “asleep at the wheel 
for years.”51 
Documents and testimony later revealed that the Bush 
Administration had considered replacing all 93 U.S. Attorneys.52  
In 2005, White House Deputy Chief of Staff Karl Rove and White 
House Counsel Harriet Miers discussed dismissing all current 
U.S. Attorneys.53  AG Gonzales rejected the idea of replacing all 
93 attorneys as disruptive and suggested a more limited 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 See Leigh Ferrara, Don’t Lean on Me: Fired Prosecutors Speak 
Out on Capitol Hill, Mother Jones, Mar.6, 2007, available at 
http://www.motherjones.com/washington_dispatch/2007/03/us_attorn
ey_senate_judiciary_hearing.html.  
52 See House Hearing, supra note 25; Senate Hearing, supra note 
30; Sampson Emails, supra note 50.   
53 See Jan Crawford Greenburg, E-Mails Show Rove’s Role in U.S. 
Attorney Firings, ABCNews, Mar. 15, 2007, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=2954988&page=1; A Story 
Unravels, Wash. Post, Mar. 14, 2007, Editorials at A14.; Dan 
Eggen and John Solomon, Firings Had Genesis in White House, 
Wash. Post, Mar. 13, 2007, at A01.  See also discussion infra 
Part II.B.   
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restructuring.54  The administration eventually decided to 
dismiss 15 to 20 percent of the current U.S. Attorneys, 
selecting them based on their perceived loyalty to the Bush 
Administration.55  The drop-list also included those who did a 
poor job pursuing Bush administration priorities such as voter 
fraud prosecutions, immigration, and gun cases.56  Gonzales’s 
Chief of Staff, Kyle Sampson, sent an e-mail to Miers in March 
2005 that ranked all 93 U.S. attorneys.57  Strong performers 
“exhibited loyalty” to the administration; low performers were 
“weak U.S. attorneys who have been ineffectual managers and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 See Gonzales Testifies Before House Judiciary Committee, 
Hearing on Oversight of the Department of Justice, CQ 
Transcripts Wire, May 10, 2007, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/content/article/2007/05/10/gonzalez_testimony_051007.html. 
55 See John Solomon and Dan Eggen, Justice Dept. Advocated 
Removing 15-20 Percent of U.S. Attorneys, E-Mails Show, Wash. 
Post, Mar. 15, 2007, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/03/15/AR2007031501734.html; Eggen, 
supra note 46. 
56 See Solomon and Eggen, supra note 55.  
57 See Eggen and Solomon, supra note 53.   
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prosecutors, chafed against Administration initiatives, etc.”58  
After several versions, Sampson developed a final list of names 
– later admitting that the “distinction between ‘political’ and 
‘performance-related’ reasons for removing a U.S. Attorney 
[was], in [his] view, largely artificial.”59  He finalized the 
list and gained approval, and the Bush Administration, through 
Gonzales, subsequently dismissed the seven U.S. Attorneys on the 
list.60 
The firings eventually erupted into a scandal, and many in 
media and public became alarmed and appalled at the 
“politicization” of the DOJ,61 an administrative body with the 
word “Justice” in its title and mission statement.  By March 
2007, the House and Senate had taken steps to investigate the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Id. 
59 See D. Kyle Sampson, Prepared Statement to the United States 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Mar. 29, 2007, page 2, 
available at 
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/images/news/graphics/070328sampson.
pdf. 
60 Id.   
61 See Patrick J. Kelly, President’s Page, Bench and Bar of 
Minnesota, Apr. 7, 2007. 
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dismissals.62  Miers had left her position in January 2007, prior 
to the news frenzy.63  But Sampson, who had used his position as 
Gonzales’s Chief of Staff to become the U.S. Attorney in Utah, 
would announce his resignation on March 13, 2007 due to negative 
media attention.64  Gonzales, after vigorously defending his 
actions, would finally resign on August 27, 2007.65 
II.  Illegal Actions? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 See Dan Eggen and Paul Kane, House Panel Subpoenas Fired U.S. 
Attorneys, Washington Post, Mar. 2, 2007, at A4, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/03/01/AR2007030101368.html. 
63 See Deb Riechmann, Miers Resigns As White House Counsel, Wash. 
Post, Jan. 5, 2007, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/01/05/AR2007010500517.html. 
64 See Eric Lipton, Fast-Rider’s High Hopes and Sudden Fall, N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 13, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/13/washington/13sampson.html.     
65 See Dan Eggen and Michael A. Fletcher, Embattled Gonzales 
Resigns, Attorney General Was Criticized for Terrorism Policy, 
Prosecutor Firings, Wash. Post, Aug. 28, 2007, at A1, available 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/08/27/AR2007082700372.html. 
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All U.S. Attorneys serve at the pleasure of the President 
and are subject to removal by the President at any time.66  If 
this is the case, why did the dismissal spark such intense 
scrutiny and criticism?  Was not the President simply executing 
his “presidential privilege?”  Are there are restrictions or 
perimeters of the President’s power to appoint and dismiss U.S. 
Attorneys, and if there are, what are they?      
A.  Legal Perimeters to Presidential Privilege  
The DOJ and Gonzales have repeatedly defended the 
dismissals as legitimate exercises of the President’s 
authority.67  Others who support the Administration’s decisions 
have made the same argument as well.68  Andrew McCarty, a former 
Assistant U.S. Attorney, states that there are no legal limits 
to this “unreviewable” presidential power.69  But even he admits 
that the President may not use this power indiscriminately and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 28 U.S.C. §541(c). 
67 See, e.g., Gonzales, supra note 54. 
68 See Audio Recording: The U.S. Attorney Controversy, The 
Federalist Society, (Mar. 27, 2007) (Andrew McCarty, Center for 
American Progress), available at http://www.fed-
soc.org/audioLib/USAttorneyControversy-3-27-06.mp3. 
69 Id. 
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is certainly barred from using it to promote corruption and 
obstruction of justice.70 
Furthermore, others have suggested that in addition to the 
actual dismissals, the DOJ’s inconsistent statements to Congress 
explaining the dismissals may have been illegal.71  
Misrepresentation to Congress are illegal, under 18 U.S.C. § 
1505.72  The DOJ’s inconsistent statements regarding the reasons 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Id. 
71 See Adam Cohen, It Wasn’t Just a Bad Idea.  It May Have Been 
Against the Law, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19,2007, Editorial Observer, 
available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/19/opinion/19mon4.html?_r=1&oref=
slogin; Audio Recording, supra note 68.   
72 See 18 U.S.C § 1505:  
Obstruction of proceedings before departments, 
agencies, and committees:  
 
Whoever, with intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or 
obstruct compliance, in whole or in part, with any 
civil investigative demand duly and properly made 
under the Antitrust Civil Process Act, willfully 
withholds, misrepresents, removes from any place, 
conceals, covers up, destroys, mutilates, alters, or 
by other means falsifies any documentary material, 
answers to written interrogatories, or oral testimony, 
which is the subject of such demand; or attempts to do 
so or solicits another to do so; or 
 
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any 
threatening letter or communication influences, 
obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, 
obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration 
23	  
	  
behind the dismissals and White House involvement, along with AG 
Gonzales’s assertion that the dismissals were not for political 
reasons, may have violate the statute.73  In addition, one of the 
dismissed U.S. Attorneys, Cummins, stated that Michael Elston, 
McNulty’s Chief of Staff, contacted and possible other dismissed 
U.S. Attorneys and suggested that he not respond to questions 
regarding his dismissal.74  These actions may have been witness 
tampering, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b).75 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of the law under which any pending proceeding is being 
had before any department or agency of the United 
States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of 
inquiry under which any inquiry or investigation is 
being had by either House, or any committee of either 
House or any joint committee of the Congress—  
 
Shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more 
than 5 years or, if the offense involves international 
or domestic terrorism (as defined in section 2331), 
imprisoned not more than 8 years, or both. 
 
73 See Audio Recording, supra note 68, (Jonathan Turley, GW 
School of Law Professor).   
74 See Cohen, supra note 71.   
75 Id.;  18 U.S.C. § 1512(b):  
Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or 
corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do 
so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another 
person, with intent to— 
 
(1) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any 
person in an official proceeding;  
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Ironically, the DOJ’s contradictory and inaccurate 
explanations of the dismissals served little purpose but to 
created confusion and attracted suspicion.  Had the DOJ only 
asserted presidential power to dismiss the attorneys, without 
mentioning performance issues, the dismissals may not have 
attracted such critical media and public attention.  
B. Non-Legal Perimeters and Precedence 
Others have suggested that the dismissals, while not 
technically illegal, may have been improper for other reasons 
and therefore worthy of public scrutiny.76   Mark Agrast has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(2) cause or induce any person to-- (A) withhold 
testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other 
object, from an official proceeding; 
(B) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object 
with intent to impair the object's integrity or 
availability for use in an official proceeding;(C) 
evade legal process summoning that person to appear as 
a witness, or to produce a record, document, or other 
object, in an official proceeding; or (D) be absent 
from an official proceeding to which such person has 
been summoned by legal process; or  
 
(3) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a 
law enforcement officer or judge of the United States 
of information relating to the commission or possible 
commission of a Federal offense or a violation of 
conditions of probation supervised release, parole, or 
release pending judicial proceedings;  
 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 
than ten years, or both. 
 
76 See Audio Recording, supra note 68, (Mark Agrast Center for 
American Progress). 
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argued that even if the appointees and the process are 
inherently “political” and that the President is legally 
permitted to dismiss appointees on any whim, he should not do 
so.77  According to Agrast, U.S. Attorneys wield immense power, 
exercise more control over life, liberty, and reputation than 
any other person in the United States, and are the embodiment of 
the system of justice.78  Therefore, the dismissals, if for 
failure to be loyal “Bushies” or for failure to follow executive 
priorities, would be improper and should legitimately garner 
reaction and criticism.79 
In addition, the public may be justified in questioning 
these dismissals because they were factually unlike any other 
prior U.S. Attorney dismissal.80   No sitting president has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Id.   
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 See CSC Attorney Report, supra note 31.  However, Edward 
Whelan, President of the Ethics and Public Policy Center, during 
his discussion at the Federal Society, questions the accuracy of 
the report’s results.  He admits that he has not read the report 
but suggests that previous dismissals for “political reasons” 
may have simply been executed quietly.  See Audio Recording, 
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dismissed U.S. Attorneys without cause in the magnitude and 
manner that President Bush did.81  Newly inaugurated presidents 
traditionally replace the former president’s appointments, 
“clearing the palette” and dismissing U.S. Attorneys installed 
by the previous administration.82  Former AG Janet Reno dismissed 
all 93 U.S. Attorneys in March 1993 when President Clinton was 
first elected.83  Likewise, when President Bush first came into 
office, he removed nearly all the U.S. Attorneys and replaced 
them with new appointments.84  President Bush’s second attempt to 
turnover personnel, in contrast, removed U.S. Attorneys that he 
had personally appointed.  U.S. Attorneys, from tradition and 
history, barring misconduct, generally serve out their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
supra note 68 (Edward Whelan, President of the Ethics and Public 
Policy Center). 
81 Id.     
82 See James Eisenstein, Counsel for the United States 35 (1978). 
83 See The Hubbell Standard, Hilary Clinton knows all about 
sacking U.S. Attorneys, Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 2007, Review & 
Outlook, available at 
http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=11000978
4.   
84 See Eggen, supra note 39.   
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appointment until the end of the appointing President’s tenure.85  
Because these dismissals were factually unlike any other prior 
dismissals, they raised questions of misconduct, illegality, and 
abuse of power.   
According to a Congressional Research Service report 
released on March 19, 2007, in virtually all dismissals from the 
past 26 years, only serious issues of personal or professional 
conduct led to a dismissal.86  Of the 468 confirmations made by 
the Senate between 1981 and 2006, 54 U.S. Attorneys left office 
before completing their four-year term and whose terms did not 
extend beyond one President’s tenure in office.87  Out of the 54 
attorneys, 18 left to becomes judges, and 15 left to enter or 
return to private practice. 88  Six attorneys left to take 
positions in the executive branch, four left to seek elective 
office, two left to serve in state government, and one died.89  
Of the remaining eight, two attorneys were dismissed with cause: 
William Kenney, dismissed in 1982 for accusing the Justice 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 See House Hearing, supra note 25 (Carol Lam, former U.S. 
Attorney).  
86 See CSC Attorney Report, supra note 31. 
87 Id.   
88 Id.  
89 Id.  
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Department with blocking his attempt to prosecute former CIA 
informants, and J. William Petro, dismissed in 1984 due to 
improper disclosure of information regarding an undercover 
operation.90  Out of the remaining six, three attorneys resigned 
after committing questionable conduct, including grabbing a 
reporter’s throat, biting a topless dancer, and lying to federal 
officials.91  The final three attorneys’ reasons for leaving are 
unknown.92  While the President may have power to dismiss any 
U.S. Attorney at will, previous sitting Presidents only 
dismissed U.S. Attorneys with cause and never approached the 
magnitude of the Bush Administration’s dismissals. 
C.  The Patriot Act 
In addition, these dismissals attracted scrutiny due to a 
recent procedural change in filling vacant U.S. Attorney 
positions.  In Prior to March 2006, an interim U.S. Attorney 
could only fill a vacant U.S. Attorney position for a maximum of 
120 days.93  However, on March 9, 2006, President Bush 
reauthorized the Patriot Act with an amendment that permitted 
the Attorney General to appoint interim U.S. Attorneys, who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Id.  
91 Id.  
92 Id. 
93 See Ferrara, supra note 51.   
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could then serve for an indefinite period of time.94  These 
attorneys could serve for the remainder of the presidential term 
without receiving Senate confirmation.95   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 See Press Release, The White House: Office of the Press 
Secretary, President Signs H.R. 3199 and S. 2271 (Mar. 9, 2006), 
available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060309-9.html; 
Ferrara, supra note 51; 28 U.S.C. § 546; USA Patriot Improvement 
and Reauthorization Act of 2005, PL 109-177, March 9, 2006, 120 
Stat 192.   
The original subsection (c) read:  
A person appointed as United States attorney under 
this section may serve until the earlier of -- (1) the 
qualification of a United States attorney for such 
district appointed by the President under section 541 
of this title; or (2) the expiration of 120 days after 
appointment by the Attorney General under this 
section. 
 
The 2006 Amendment rewrote it to read: 
A person appointed as United States attorney under 
this section may serve until the qualification of a 
United States Attorney for such district appointed by 
the President under section 541 of this title. 
 
In 2007, the House and Senate reintroduced the 120 day 
restriction to subsection (c) and added subsection (d):  
(c)A person appointed as United States attorney under 
this section may serve until the earlier of -- (1) the 
qualification of a United States attorney for such 
district appointed by the President under section 541 
of this title; or (2) the expiration of 120 days after 
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Selecting U.S. Attorneys is a political process that 
usually involves both the Executive and Legislative branches of 
government.96  Senators can influence the appointment of U.S. 
Attorneys in their states and have practical veto power of the 
President’s choices.97  With the new process in place, an 
administration could strategically use the absence of Senate 
confirmation to install attorneys who may never have gained 
Senate approval.  Under this change, President Bush did install 
new U.S. Attorneys without Senate confirmation.  Congress 
quickly closed this loophole in June 2007,98 but its existence 
and the Bush Administration’s use of it only bolstered 
accusations of impropriety and political machinations. 
III. Obstruction of Justice 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
appointment by the Attorney General under this 
section.   
 
(d) If an appointment expires under subsection (c)(2) 
of this section, the district court for such district 
may appoint a United States attorney to serve until 
the vacancy is filled. The order of appointment by the 
court shall be filed with the clerk of the court. 
 
95 See id. 
96 See Audio Recording, supra note 68, (Andrew McCarty, 
Federalist Discussion).  
97 Id. 
98 See Preserving United States Attorney Independence Act of 
2007, PL 110-34, June 14, 2007, 121 Stat 224. 
31	  
	  
As mentioned in the Part II, Section A, a president’s 
privilege to dismiss U.S. Attorneys may be limited by actions 
that constitute an obstruction of justice.99  Interfering with 
official proceedings in an obstruction of justice,100 and if the 
dismissals were motivated by a desire to interfere with official 
proceedings, the dismissals may have been obstructions of 
justice.101  Of the seven attorneys fired in December 2007, the 
dismissals of Carol Lam and David Iglesias present the strongest 
cases for such violations.102  Lam may have been fired due to her 
high-profile prosecution of Republican Representative Randy 
“Duke” Cunningham.103  Iglesias may have been fired for his 
refusal to prosecute Democratic officials.104   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 See Audio Recording, supra, note 68. 
100 See 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (c). 
101 Id. 
102 See 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (c). 
103 See David Johnston, Ex-C.I.A. Official Indicted in Inquiry 
Into Contacts, Wash. Post., Feb. 14, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/14/washington/14indict.html.  See 
also Adam Cohen, Why Have So Many U.S. Attorneys Been Fired?  It 
Looks a Lot Like Politics, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 2007, available 
at 
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A.  18 U.S.C. § 1512 (c)(2) 
Obstruction of justice is “interference with the orderly 
administration of law and justice, as by giving false 
information to or withholding evidence from a police officer or 
prosecutor, or by harming or intimidating a witness or juror.”105  
It is the “frustration of government purposes by violence, 
corruption, destruction of evidence, or deceit.”106  It may also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/26/opinion/26mon4.html?_r=1&scp=8
&sq=cohen+U.S+Attorney&oref=slogin. 
104 See Sridhar Pappu, The Next Best Path, Warming to Limelight, 
Dismissed U.S. Attorney David Iglesias Forges a New Future, 
Wash. Post., May 22, 2007, at C1, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/05/21/AR2007052101784.html; Dan Eggen, 
Fired U.S. Attorney Says Lawmakers Pressured Him, Wash. Post., 
Mar. 1, 2007, at A10, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/02/28/AR2007022801502.html; House 
Hearing, supra note 25.   
105 Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). 
106 See Charles Doyle, CRS Report for Congress: Obstruction of 
Justice: An Overview of Some of the Federal Statutes that 
Prohibit Interference with Judicial, Executive, or Legislative 
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include any action not recognized as a distinct crime that is 
intended to distort or impede the administration of law.107  Six 
major provisions outline the general federal obstruction 
offenses: tampering with federal witnesses (18 U.S.C. § 1512), 
retaliating against federal witnesses (18 U.S.C. § 1513), 
obstruction of pending federal court proceedings (18 U.S.C. § 
1503), obstruction of pending Congressional or federal 
administrative proceedings (18 U.S.C § 1505), conspiracy (18 
U.S.C § 371), and contempt (18 U.S.C. § 401, 402).108   
Congress originally enacted Section 1512 to provide federal 
protection of witnesses.109  However, Congress revised this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Activities, Dec. 27, 2007, at 1,available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34303.pdf. 
107 See Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 552 (3d 
ed. 1982).   
108 See Doyle, supra note 106. 
109 See Tracey B. Fitzpatrick and Stacey L. Parker, Obstruction 
of Justice, 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 747, 759 (1994).  Congress, by 
enacting this section, did not intend to remove witness 
tampering from Section 1503 and to consolidate all such offenses 
into this section but enacted this section to prohibit specific 
forms of witness coercion.  See also, U.S. v. Lester, 749 F.2d 
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section in 2002 when the Enron, WorldCom, and other corporate 
scandals shook the business world.110  It passed the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, which President Bush called the “most far-
reaching reforms of American business practices since the times 
of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.”111  The bill overhauled corporate, 
securities, and accounting laws,112 created two new obstruction 
of justice related offenses regarding the destruction of 
documents,113 and a new subsection to Section 1512.114  This new 
subsection, (c), reads:   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1288; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, PL 107-204, July 30, 2002, HR 
3763, 116 Stat 745. 
110 See Michael Perino, Enron’s Legislative Aftermath: Some 
Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, 67 St. John’s L. R., 671, 677 (2002). 
111 See Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud In 
Corporations, N.Y. Times, July 31, 2002, at A1. 
112 Id.  
113 Under new 18 U.S.C. § 1519, individuals that knowingly 
destroy, alter, or falsify records “with the intent to impede, 
obstruct, or influence” a federal investigation or bankruptcy 
proceeding are subject to fines and potential imprisonment of up 
to twenty years.  Another provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1520(a)(1),  
relates to the destruction of corporate audits and requires 
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(c) Whoever corruptly-- 
(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a 
record, document, or other object, or attempts to 
do so, with the intent to impair the object's 
integrity or availability for use in an official 
proceeding; or 
(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes 
any official proceeding, or attempts to do so, 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
more than 20 years, or both.115 
 
Congress created and enacted this new section to “plug holes” in 
the existing statues116 and help courts prosecute those who 
obstruct justice by destroying evidence.117  Section 1512(b) 
permitted the court to prosecute an individual who persuaded 
another to destroy documents, but no federal statute permitted 
the courts to prosecute an individual who personally destroyed 
the same documents.118  Section 1512(c) now permitted courts to 
take such action.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
accountants that conduct audits under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 to maintain all audit or review documents for five 
years.  See Perino, supra note 110. 
114 See Perino, supra note 100; 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c).  
115 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (c). 
116 See Debate, Remarks by Mr. Leahy Upon Introduction of S. 2010 
in the Senate, March 12, 2002, pp. S1785-1792.   
117 See Doyle, supra note 106, at 16. 
118 See Debate, supra note 116.     
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 Despite the historical roots of Section 1512(c), the courts 
have liberally interpreted Section 1512(c)(2) to charge people 
with crimes unrelated to document destruction.119  In U.S. v. 
Lucas, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
affirmed the appellant’s conviction of attempted obstruction of 
justice, under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), when he asked others to 
claim ownership of his gun to avoid being charged with 
possession of a weapon.120  In U.S. v. Reich, the United States 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Indeed, the other subsections of Section 1512 require a 
defendant to act upon another party to obstruct or impede 
justice.  Only Subsection (c) convicts an individual for his or 
her own actions, absent another party.  See 18 U.S.C. §§(a), 
(b), and (d). 
119 See U.S. v. Lucas, 499 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 2007); U.S. v. 
Reich, 479 F.3d 179 (2nd Cir. 2007). 
120 See id., 499 F.3d 769. The appellant escaped from a work 
release program, and when the police apprehended him, they found 
drugs, cash, and a stolen revolver.  Id. at 774.  While in jail, 
the appellant’s telephone calls were recorded as part of routine 
policy, and he was heard asking different individuals to claim 
ownership of the gun in exchange for money.  Id.  The appellant 
was found guilty of obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 
1512(c)(2).  Id. at 780-81.  
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the conviction of 
the appellant for obstruction of justice, under the same 
subsection, when he used a forged court document in an attempt 
to mislead the opposing counsel.121  Indeed, the plain language 
of Section 1512(c)(2) - which indicates that anyone who 
“obstructs, influences, or impedes an official proceeding or 
attempts to do so,” shall be fined or imprisoned122 - appears to 
expand the reach of the statute beyond mere document 
destruction.  An obstruction of justice charge against the Bush 
Administration may, therefore, be easiest to obtain under this 
statute’s broad scope.   
B. 18 U.S.C. 1512(c)(2) Elements: Official Proceeding and  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 479 F.3d 179, 181-82 (2nd Cir. 2007).  The appellant had 
filed an arbitration proceeding against a brokerage firm, which 
was then acquired by another firm.  Id. at 182.  The appellant 
then sent a forced court document to the opposing party’s 
attorneys, stating incorrectly that their preliminary injunction 
was recalled and vacated, that the opposing party had been 
enjoined from proceeding with the arbitration hearing, and that 
the supervising judge had recused herself.  Id.  The appellant 
challenged the conviction, but the court upheld it.  Id. at 185-
187.  
122 18 U.S.C. 1512(c)(2) 
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Nexus Requirement 
A conviction under this subsection requires an intent to 
violate the subsection and a substantial step toward the 
accomplishment of that goal.123  It also requires an “official 
proceeding.”  Subsection (f)(1) of the same section states that 
for the purposes of Section 1512, “an official proceeding need 
not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the 
offense. . .”124     
Furthermore, a conviction requires a “nexus between [the] 
defendant’s conduct and the effect on the judicial proceedings.” 
125  In Reich, the court held that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 
1512(c)(2) requires a “nexus” outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in U.S. v. Aguilar.126  According to Aguilar, a conviction under 
18 U.S.C. § 1503,127 another obstruction of justice statute, 
requires that the defendant’s act must have a relationship in 
time, causation, or logic with the judicial proceeding. 128  The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 See U.S. v. Lucas, 499 F.3d 769, 781 (8th Cir. 2007). 
124 18 U.S.C. 1512(f) 
125 See Reich, 479 F.3d at 192. 
126 Id.  See also U.S. v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995) 
127 One of the six major federal obstruction of justice statutes 
mentioned in Part III, Section A.  
128 Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599. 
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act must have the “natural and probable effect” of interfering 
with the administration of justice.129  The U.S. Supreme Court 
also discussed one of its previous cases, Pettibone v. U.S.,130 
in which it reasoned that “a person lacking knowledge of a 
pending proceeding necessarily lacked the evil intent to 
obstruct.”131  The court in Reich – in light of the fact that it 
had required the Aguilar nexus requirement for 28 U.S.C. §§ 1503 
and 1505 convictions132 and given the language similarities 
between those sections and Section 1512(c)(2) – ultimately 
decided to require the Aguilar nexus for a Section 1512(c)(2) 
conviction as well.133   
The “official proceeding” and “nexus” requirements play 
important roles in analyzing the Bush Administration’s actions.  
As discussed in the following section, a 18 U.S.C 1512(c)(2) 
conviction may hinge on a court’s interpretation of these 
elements.   
IV. Lam and Iglesias’s Dismissals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Id. 
130 148 U.S. 197, (1893). 
131 Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599. 
132 Reich, 479 F. 3d at 186. 
133 Id. 
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Many Democrats and others in the media have speculated that 
the White House dismissed Carol Lam because of her prosecution 
of Republican Representative Randy “Duke” Cunningham.134  David 
Iglesias himself testified during congressional hearings in 
March 2007 that he believed he was dismissed for failing to 
bring charges against former Democratic state senator Manny 
Aragon and others involving government construction projects in 
Bernalillo County, New Mexico.135  If the White House, through 
the DOJ, dismissed Lam and Iglesias with an intent to “obstruct, 
influence, or impede” an official proceeding related to these 
investigations, then its actions may have been obstructions of 
justice and prosecutable under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2).  
A. Analysis of Lam’s Dismissal 
Many Democrats have suggested that the White House 
dismissed Lam for prosecuting Republican Representative Randy 
“Duke” Cunningham.136   
1.  Alleged Failure to Prosecute Gun and Immigration  
Crimes 
 In 2002, President Bush nominated Lam to be the U.S. 
Attorney for the Southern District of California, and the Senate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 See supra note 103. 
135 See supra note 104. 
136 See supra note 103.   
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confirmed the nomination.137  From 2002 to 2007, Lam received 
numerous positive performance evaluations, department awards, and 
community awards. 138  On December 6, 2006, the Director of the 
Executive Office for US Attorneys, Michael Battle, asked her to 
resign.139  He failed to tell her reasons for her dismissal,140 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 See generally Bush Administration Nominations by Name, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/nominations/884.html (which lists 
all of President Bush’s nominations). 
138 See Ferrara, supra note 51.  Lam received the Director’s 
Award for Superior Performance and the Attorney General’s Award 
for Distinguished Service.  Qualcomm Press Release, Feb. 15, 
2007, available at 
http://www.qualcomm.com/press/releases/2007/070215_appoints_caro
l_c.html.  In 2003, Lam was given the San Diego Club Top 
Headliner of the Year (Federal Law Enforcement) award.  In 2005, 
she received the Los Angeles Daily Journal “Top 100 Lawyers” 
award.  In 2007, Lam was awarded the U.S. Health & Human 
Services Inspector General’s Awards, the Los Angeles Daily 
Journal “Top 75 Women Litigators” award, and the San Diego 
County Bar Association Outstanding Lawyer of the Year award.  
See House Hearing, supra note 25.   
139 See House Hearing, supra note 25. 
140 Id.   
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and Lam was unaware that her job performance was “inadequate” in 
any manner.141  Lam then contacted Deputy Attorney General Paul 
McNulty to inquire why she had been asked to resign.142  He 
stated that he needed time to think and did not want to give her 
an “answer ‘that would lead’ [her] down the wrong route.”143  She 
then contacted Battle to request time to prepare her office for 
her departure, as she was asked to resign effective January 31, 
2007.144  Michael Elston, who was Chief of Staff to McNulty, 
responded to her request and stated that it was not “received 
positively” and suggested that she depart in a matter of weeks, 
not months.145  Lam subsequently submitted her resignation on 
January 16, 2007, effective February 15, 2007.146 
 Justice Department officials would later state that the 
dismissal was based on her inadequate record of prosecuting 
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142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id.  
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firearm violations and illegal immigration.147  According to the 
Justice Department, Lam caught its attention back in 2004 when 
she pursued fewer illegal immigration cases than other 
districts.148  In July 2004, House Republicans from California 
sent a letter to then Attorney General John Ashcroft to complain 
about Lam’s office’s failure to address illegal immigration.149  
United States Representative of California’s 49th District, 
Darrell Issa, repeatedly complained about Lam, and sent a letter 
to Gonzales in October 2005 complaining of her failure to handle 
a specific illegal immigration case.150  In May 2006, Kyle 
Sampson, Chief of Staff to AG Gonzales, wrote an email to Bill 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 See David Johnston, Justice Depart. Names New Prosecutors, 
Forcing Some Out, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/17/washington/17justice.html. 
148 See Jennifer Steinhauer and Eric Lipton, Ousted California 
Prosecutor Previously Had Disputes on Strategy, N.Y. Times, Mar. 
21, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/21/us/politics/21lam.html. 
149 Id.   
150 See William Finn Bennett, U.S. Attorney Lam resigns, N. 
County Times, Jan. 16, 2007, available at 
http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2007/01/17/news/top_stories/1_00
_991_16_07.txt. 
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Mercer official regarding Lam and immigration enforcement 
issues.151  In June 2006, Sampson wrote another email to another 
official which said, “Have a heart-to-heart with Lam about the 
urgent need to improve immigration enforcement... [i]f she balks 
on any of the foregoing or otherwise does not perform in a 
measurable way by July 15 [my date] remove her.”152 
 Lam, in responding to questions before the House Judiciary 
Committee, would state that she had no knowledge her dismissal 
was related to her attention to those two issues.153  With 
regards to the gun issue, Lam would state that her office 
determined that the District Attorneys were doing a good job 
prosecuting gun crimes, and it implemented a protocol in which 
it would prosecute a case if it were not being handled 
effectively by the state or in cases where a substantially 
higher sentence would be available.154  As a result, her office 
did not prosecute a high number of gun crimes.155   
With regards to immigration, Lam stated that her office was 
initially “neglecting important large smuggling investigations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 See Sampson Emails, supra note 50, May 31, 2006 email.   
152 See Steinhauer and Lipton, supra note 148.   
153 See House Hearing, supra note 25. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
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in order to meet the demands of handling numerous smaller 
reactive cases.”156  Therefore, after two years of study, her 
office “implemented new guidelines focused on investigations and 
prosecutions of alien smuggling organizations, corrupt border 
law enforcement agents, and immigration defendants with prior 
convictions for violent crimes.”157  The change in approach lead 
to “huge cases, which yielded only a few ‘stats’ but dismantled 
criminal organizations” and would not have been possible if her 
office focused on “dozens of small cases involving lower-level 
criminals.”158  She stated that her office pursued “more serious 
immigration crime, which may have yielded fewer statistics, but 
put behind bars more serious criminals for longer periods of 
time.”159 
Furthermore, Lam defended her decisions, stating that while 
the AG technically sets the priorities for the Department, there 
is substantial variance in local priorities because of the 
discretion that lies with each individual local U.S. Attorney. 160  
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160 See H.W. Perry, United States Attorneys – Whom Shall They 
Serve?, Law and Contemp. Probs, 129, 138 (Winter 1998). 
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Illegal immigration may be the priority of the Attorney General, 
but if other issues, such as civil rights enforcement for 
example, are the U.S. Attorney’s priority, then she has the 
prerogative to pursue such a priority.161  U.S. Attorneys’ 
offices enjoy considerable autonomy in deciding whether to bring 
a federal prosecution.162  Regions may be plagued by different 
types of crime,163  and law enforcement flexibility absolutely 
vital.164  Prosecutors will inevitably respond to pressures from 
within the communities in which they work.165   
As the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of 
California, Lam had the prerogative to pursue cases and crimes 
she believed to be pertinent to that particular community.  Thus 
even if Lam’s pursuit of gun or immigration cases were lax, they 
may have been insufficient grounds for a dismissal “for cause,” 
especially given Lam’s numerous accolades.   
 2. Political Pressure 
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162 See Michael Edmund O’Neill, Understanding Federal 
Declinations: An Empirical Analysis of Predictive Factors, Am. 
Crim. L. Rev., 1439, 1440 (Fall 2004). 
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Others have suggested that Lam’s dismissal had more to do 
with political retribution for her successful prosecution of 
Republican politicians than her alleged failure to prosecute gun 
and illegal immigration crimes.166  Disclosed emails and 
testimony suggest that Lam was targeted because of her 
supervision of the probe that resulted in the guilty plea of 
then Representative Randy “Duke” Cunningham, a Republican.167  On 
May 10, 2006, Lam’s office notified the Justice Department of 
search warrants in a Republican bribery scandal.168  The next 
day, May 11, the Attorney General’s Chief of Staff, Sampson, 
warned the White House that Lam was a “real problem.” 169 Sampson 
sent an e-mail message to William Kelley in the White House 
counsel’s office saying that Lam should be removed as soon as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 See Steinhauer and Lipton, supra note 148; Ferrara, supra 
note 51. 
167 See Steinhauer and Lipton, supra note 148. 
168 See Dan Eggen, Prosecutor’s Firing Was Urged During Probe, 
Wash. Post, Mar. 19, 2007, A3, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/03/18/AR2007031801263.html.  See also, 
Johnston, supra note 103.   
169 See Eggen, supra note 168.   
48	  
	  
quickly as possible.170  Lam later sent a notice to the Justice 
Department saying that there would be two search warrants in a 
criminal investigation of defense contractor Brent R. Wilkes and 
Kyle “Dusty” Foggo, who had just quit as the CIA’s top 
administrator amid questions about his ties to Cunningham.171  
The FBI raided Foggo’s home,172 and Foggo was indicated along 
with Wilkes on fraud and money-laundering charges on Feb. 13, 
two days before Lam departure.173   
When Sampson created his initial hit-list, he admittedly 
evaluated potential dismissal candidates by their relationships 
with law enforcement and other government leaders, and their 
support for the priorities of the president and the attorney 
general.174  He testified that that a “U.S. Attorney who is 
unsuccessful from a political perspective, either because he or 
she had alienated the leadership of the department in Washington 
or cannot work constructively with law enforcement or other 
government constituencies in the district, is unsuccessful.”175  
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Sampson’s initial list, dated January 1, 2006 and sent via 
official memorandum to Miers, included Lam’s name.176  Another 
Sampson list, compiled in March of 2005 ranked all the U.S. 
Attorneys, and Lam was one of the attorneys he suggested for 
removal.177  News of the Cunningham scandal did not break until 
June 2005.178  Sampson finalized the list in the fall of 2006. 179  
3. Application of Federal Statute 
 Sampson’s statements indicate that while Lam was on his 
“radar” for immigration complaints, she was not dismissed for 
the stated immigration and gun issues.  If immigration was the 
real issue, then, according to his previous email, 180 Sampson 
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should have tried to remove her by July 15, 2006, independent of 
the U.S. Attorney dismissal list.  In addition, while Lam was on 
the initial list, Sampson did not finalize the dismissal list 
until late 2006.181  There is no indication that he declined to 
dismiss Lam in July 2006 in order to dismiss her in December 
2006.  If Sampson had a legitimate reason to dismiss Lam, there 
is no reason why he would have waited until December.182  His May 
2006 email further implies that it was her prosecution of 
Cunningham that drew administration ire, and the timing of the 
events suggests that Lam’s name remained on the list because of 
the Cunningham case.  Therefore, while the immigration reasons 
stated by the DOJ may have initially caused Lam’s name to appear 
on the list, it was her prosecution of Cunningham that kept her 
name onto Sampson’s final list. 
 The plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) requires that 
the accused intent to obstruct, influence, or impede an official 
proceeding.  Under Aguilar,183 a charge of obstruction of justice 
under that subsection requires a “nexus between a defendant’s 
conduct and the effect on the  judicial proceeding.”  In Lam’s 
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case, it would be difficult for a court to find that Sampson or 
the Bush Administration acted to obstruct the judicial 
proceeding of the Cunningham case or the subsequent Foggo and 
Wilkes cases.  The Cunningham scandal reached the press in June 
2005,184 and by mid-2006, Lam was already intensely pursuing the 
case.185  Likewise, with the Foggo and Wilkes cases, the timing 
of Lam’s dismissal was too late to affect their cases at all.  
The Bush Administration could have easily removed Lam with less 
attention between June 2005 and May 2006 if it intended to 
impede her investigations.  If it had done so then, the 
administration could be liable for obstruction of justice 
violations.      
 What is more probable is that the Bush Administration acted 
in retaliation for Lam’s persistence in the Cunningham case, not 
in an effort to corrupt, influence, or impede the it.  While the 
dismissal was dishonest and dishonorable, it does not easily 
satisfy the “official proceeding” or “nexus” requirements.   
One could argue that the retaliatory nature of the 
dismissal may obstruct, influence, or impede “future” official 
proceedings by creating a “chilling effect.”  U.S. Attorneys may 
think twice before bringing cases against politically powerful 
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or Administration-supported politicians.  However, case law that 
discusses the “nexus” requirement indicates that courts will 
narrowly interpret this requirement.186  Furthermore, case law 
also indicates that courts are unwilling to broadly interpret 
both the “official proceeding” and the “nexus” requirement for 
other subsections of Section 1512.187  A claim of a potential, 
future, unidentified official proceeding will likely be 
sufficient to support a Section 1512(c)(2) violation.   
B. Analysis of Iglesias’s Dismissal 
Iglesias indicated that he was dismissed for not bending to 
political pressure to prosecute Democrats in his state.188   
 1. Lack of Prosecution of a Case 
 Justice officials state that Iglesias, a five year veteran 
U.S. Attorney of New Mexico, had performed poorly, was absent 
too often, and therefore, dismissed. 189  Iglesias, however, had 
received positive job reviews and was increasing the numbers of 
prosecutions in his office.190  In January 2006, he received a 
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letter from Michael Battle, the DOJ officer who later fired him, 
commending him for “exemplary leadership in the department’s 
propriety programs.”191  His office’s immigration prosecutions 
had risen more than 78 percent during his tenure, and his office 
prosecuted record numbers of narcotics and firearms cases.192  
Furthermore, unlike Lam, Iglesias testified before Congress that 
he had received no notification that his superiors were 
dissatisfied with his performance.193   
 Unlike Lam’s dismissal, Iglesias’s dismissal did not 
attract as much media scrutiny or accusations of obstruction of 
justice until he publically disclosed the facts regarding the 
dismissal himself.194  Iglesias believed that he was dismissed 
because he was not aggressively pursuing an investigation 
involving a Democratic official.195  According to Iglesias’s 
testimony, Senator Pete Domenici and Representative Heather 
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Wilson, both Republican lawmakers from New Mexico, called him in 
October 2006 about a well-known criminal investigation involving 
a Democratic legislator.196  The investigation involved former 
Democratic state senator Manny Aragon and government 
construction projects in Bernalillo County.197  Iglesias stated 
the lawmakers seemed focused on whether charges would be filed 
before the November elections.198  When Iglesias stated that pre-
November charges would be unlikely, the Republican officials 
became angry.199   
According to Sampson’s testimony, Iglesias was not on the 
original list of U.S. Attorneys to be dismissed in December 
2006. 200  However, Sampson later added him in October, based in 
part on complaints from Senator Domenici and other New Mexico 
Republicans that he was not prosecuting enough voter-fraud 
cases.201   
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2. Acting Within the Scope of His Position? 
U.S. Attorneys, as lawyers representing a governmental 
client, may not engage in certain practices that would arguably 
be permissible if engaged in by lawyers representing 
nongovernmental clients.202  Their duty to “seek justice” implies 
specific professional obligations that require them to seek 
litigation that is just and fair.203  Government lawyers have 
greater responsibility to pursue the common good or the public 
interest than their counterparts in private practice, who 
represent non-governmental persons and entities.204  Furthermore, 
as prosecutors, U.S. Attorneys function as “ministers of 
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justice” and cannot purse claims that are frivolous and lack a 
“substantial basis of probable cause to pursue a case.”205   
As a U.S. Attorney, Iglesias determines the sufficiency of 
the evidence to bring charges against a party.  After evaluating 
a case, if he finds a lack of strong evidence and decides not to 
pursue action, he is acting within the scope of his position.  
If he, on the other hand, chooses to pursue politically 
motivated cases, such as voter fraud cases, that lack 
substantial evidence, he is acting outside of the professional 
rules of conduct for his position.  As a U.S. Attorney, Iglesias 
was free to decline an assignment or case he perceived as 
improper, illegal, or weak.   
Thus, Iglesias’s “failure” to prosecute a weak case would 
likely be insufficient grounds for a “for cause” dismissal.  The 
decision not to bring charges against Manny Aragon was 
completely within the scope of Iglesias’s position.  
Additionally, if Iglesias had brought charges against Manny 
Aragon with knowledge that the charges were improper, Iglesias 
himself could be in violation of his duties as a federal 
prosecutor.206  
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3. Application of the Federal Statute to the Lawmakers’  
Inquiry   
18 U.S.C. §1512(c)(2) requires an intent to obstruct, 
influence, or impede an official proceeding.  It does not, 
however, punish actions that are merely inquiries into an 
official proceeding.  When the Republican officials contacted 
Iglesias in attempts to influence his decision making, they may 
have been interfering with the process of a federal 
investigation.  However, courts may have a difficult time 
determining whether their actions were nosy inquiries or 
deliberate attempts to influence Iglesias’s investigation.  Or 
courts may find that the telephone calls were less innocent but 
not sufficiently influential enough to warrant an obstruction of 
justice charge.  Although they have apologized for making the 
phone calls, both Republican lawmakers have denied “pressuring” 
Iglesias.207  Furthermore, the unlikelihood for successful 
prosecution of these lawmakers for obstruction of justice 
violations is reflected in the lack of charges and lack of 
discussion in the media.   
An alternative theory for the lack of charges also suggests 
that perhaps Congress is willing to overlook the improprieties 
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of these lawmakers in its attempt to pursue a larger fish, the 
Bush Administration, for wrongdoing in Iglesias’s case. 
4. Application of the Federal Statute to the Bush  
Administration 
While the Republican lawmakers were putting pressure on 
Iglesias, there is no indication that the Bush Administration 
was acting similarly.  Sampson put Iglesias’s name on the 
dismissal list apparently in response to his failure to 
prosecute a Democratic official.208  This complaint was brought 
to his attention by Republican elected officials, not the Bush 
Administration.209  Furthermore, the timing of Iglesias’s 
placement on Sampson’s list was not early enough to show an 
intent to influence the corruption charges.210   As in the Lam 
case, Sampson was acting in response to politically unpopular 
actions.  This action, although distasteful, does not trigger a 
Section 1512(c)(2) violation.   
Furthermore, courts will have a difficult time establishing 
the existence of an “official proceeding” or “nexus.”  No 
“official proceeding” existed at the time of the dismissals, and 
no current case exists today.  Additionally, Iglesias’s 
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replacement, his former assistant Larry Gomez, has not taken 
action to bring corruption charges against Aragon.  Unlike other 
U.S. Attorney replacements, Gomez’s appointment does not appear 
to be politically motivated, and there is no indication the 
Sampson or the Bush Administration dismissed Iglesias to install 
a more pro-Republican attorney.   
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), it is unlikely that a court 
would find any official guilty of an obstruction of justice 
violation with regards to the dismissals of Lam and Iglesias.  
The dismissals were politically motivated and in retaliation for 
legitimate actions.  They caused public humiliation, raised 
unnecessary and painful questions regarding work performance, 
and brought shame and dishonor to a noble department whose 
mission was to pursue and protect justice.  The dismissals, 
however, did not obstruct justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (c)(2).       
V. Recommendations 
 The dismissals rightfully attracted media scrutiny and 
public scorn.  The actions of the Bush Administration were 
deplorable and should not go unpunished.  To ensure that such 
actions do not repeat themselves in the future, perhaps Congress 
should amend 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) to encompass retaliatory 
action.  However, such language would be difficult to reconcile 
with the other subsections of §1512 and the legislative intent 
behind Section 1512(c)(2).  Furthermore, criminal or civil 
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protection against retaliatory action may be difficult to define 
and prove.  Actual charges under this type of legislation may 
limit official, legitimate action, and false or frivolous 
accusations may actually hinder, not help the political process. 
 Congress could also prosecute officials under the statutes 
briefly mentioned in Part II. A.: 18 U.S.C. § 1505 
(misrepresentation to Congress) or 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (witness 
tampering).  It, additionally, could seek prosecution under one 
of the other general federal obstruction of justice statutes 
listed in Part III. A, such as 18 U.S.C § 371 (conspiracy) or 18 
U.S.C. §§ 401, 402 (contempt).  However, Congress has yet to 
take any such action, and its investigation to date does not 
appear to point to those charges.211  In addition, many of these 
charges may focus prosecute ancillary actions – such as lying to 
Congress - and not the dismissals themselves.   
 Congress could, however, provide statutory protection for 
attorney’s right of conscience and right to refuse to try 
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certain cases. 212  The American Bar Association could create a 
canon of ethics,213 which could be adopted by Congress, that 
would provide protection for prosecutors who rightfully decline 
to try cases.  Courts could then find it unreasonable for the 
government to dismiss a prosecutor for adhering to the explicit 
ethics of his or her profession and provide an appropriate 
remedy.214  This type of protection might have prevented the Bush 
Administration from dismissing Iglesias, or at the very least, 
provided him with an appropriate remedy for his inappropriate 
discharge. 
 The best solution, however, may be simple:  continue to let 
the public decide.  One of the checks on the Executive and 
Legislative branches is electability and public opinion.215  The 
public, through its democratic vote, elects both the President 
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and its legislative representatives.216 Even though a single 
official has yet to be charged and convicted with a crime, 
Gonzales and other members of his staff have resigned.  Their 
careers will undoubtedly be stained by this scandal.  While they 
will not face prison time or charges, they have earned the ire 
of the public, which may prove harder to overcome and may 
effectively end any pre-existing or burgeoning political 
career.217   
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217  Robert Bork’s career is one example of how scandal can stunt 
later political aspirations.  Solicitor General Bork, who 
finally fired special prosecutor Archibald Cox during the 
Watergate scandal, later failed to earn Senate confirmation of a 
seat on the U.S. Supreme Court despite his stellar credentials 
as a judge and law school professor.  See Gerald M. Boyd, Bork 
Nomination To Court Weighed, N.Y. Times, June 30, 1987, 
available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B0DE3D7153DF933A
05755C0A961948260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all; Linda Greenhouse, 
Ideology as Court Issue; Democrats Pick Clear Battlefield on 
Bork, But Political Consequences Are Uncertain, N.Y. Times, July 
3, 1987, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B0DE1DE113AF930A
35754C0A961948260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all. 
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Furthermore, criminal and civil convictions may not provide 
the best solutions.  Lewis “Scooter” Libby, former Assistant to 
President Bush and Chief of Staff of Vice President Dick Cheney, 
was found guilty of multiple charges, including obstruction of 
justice, related to the Valarie Plame affair.218  President Bush, 
however, commuted his prison sentence in July 2007, and many 
politicians continue to ask the President for a full pardon.219  
Former President Ford also fully pardoned Richard Nixon of his 
obstruction of justice charges.220  Guilty verdicts, especially 
when politics and Presidents are involved, are not guaranteed to 
stick, and presidential pardons easily save individuals from 
facing the consequences of their actions.  Public scorn and 
shame may perhaps be the best punishment for those who walk on 
the edges of justice.   
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218 See Amy Goldstein, Bush Commutes Libby’s Prison Sentence, 
Wash. Post., July 3, 2007, A01, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/07/02/AR2007070200825.html. 
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220 See President Gerald R. Ford’s Proclamation 4311, Granting a 
Pardon to Richard Nixon, Sept. 8, 1974, available at 
http://watergate.info/ford/pardon.shtml. 
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A court never found Nixon guilty of obstruction of justice.  
However, Nixon was forced to resign, and Watergate forever 
tainted his presidential legacy, overshadowing any 
accomplishment by his Administration.  Likewise, a court may 
never find the Bush Administration or its agents guilty of 
obstruction of justice violations.  The Bush Administration’s 
decision to dismiss seven U.S. Attorneys in December 2006 was an 
abuse of presidential privilege, a perversion of the justice 
system, and a juvenile display of revenge.  However, the 
dismissals of Carol Lam and David Iglesias, two venerable U.S. 
Attorneys, were not illegal under one of the most broad federal 
obstruction statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2).  At the same time, 
justice does not belong solely in the hands of politicians, 
judges, and juries.  The American public plays a vital role in 
determining what is right and just.  Its concern and contempt 
for the dismissals - which led to Attorney General Gonzales’s 
resignation and other resignations from members of his staff, 
changes in the Patriot Act, and clarification on appropriate DOJ 
actions - may have provided the ultimate justice.   
 
